authorized to exchange particular kinds of tra c. In many con gurations, especially when network-layer security is used to build rewalls and virtual private networks, such polices can be quite complex.
Central to the problem of engineering policy mechanisms for network security is the tradeo between expressiveness and performance. Unfortunately, many con gurations demand a high level of both.
In this position paper, we examine the problem of managing policy in network-layer security protocols, and propose a trust-management architecture for network-layer security that may satisfy both the expressibility and the performance issues.
IPSEC Policy Architecture
Let us examine the architecture of network-layer security more closely, using IPSEC as a speci c example. In this environment, policy must be enforced whenever packets arrive at or are about to leave a network security endpoint (which could be an end host, a gateway, a router, or a rewall).
When an incoming packet arrives from the network, the security endpoint rst determines the processing it requires:
{ If the packet is not protected, should it be accepted? This is essentially the \traditional" packet ltering problem, as performed, e.g., by network rewalls. { If the packet was encapsulated under the security protocol:
Is there correct key material (usually contained in a data structure called a \security association") required to decapsulate it? Should the resulting packet (after decapsulation) be accepted? A second stage of packet ltering occurs at this point. Notice that a packet may be successfully decapsulated and still not be accepted (e.g., a decapsulated packet might contain an illegal network source IP address such as 127.0.0.1).
A security endpoint makes similar decisions when an outgoing packet is ready to be sent: { Is there a security association (SA) that should be applied to this packet? If there are several applicable SAs, which one should be selected? { If there is no SA available, how should the packet be handled? It may be forwarded to some network interface, dropped, or queued until an SA is made available, possibly after triggering some automated key management mechanism such as the IPSEC ISAKMP protocol HC98].
Observe that because these questions are asked on packet-by-packet basis, policy ltering must be performed, and any related security transforms applied, quickly enough to keep up with network data rates. This implies that in all but the slowest network environments there is insu cient time to process elaborate security languages, perform public key operations, consult large tables, or resolve rule con icts in any sophisticated manner.
Implementations of network layer security services, including IPSEC and most rewalls, therefore, usually employ very simple, lter-based languages for con guring their packet-handling policies. In general, these languages specify routing rules for handling packets that match bit patterns in packet headers, based on such parameters as incoming and outgoing addresses and ports, services, packet options, etc. MJ93] However, packet-level ltering { necessary as it might be { is not the interesting problem.
Policy and Security Associations
A basic parameter of the packet processing problems mentioned in the previous section is the question of whether a packet falls under the scope of some Security Association (SA). SAs contain and manage the key material required to perform network-layer security protocol transforms. How then, do SAs get created?
The obvious approach involves the use of a public-key or Needham-Schroeder NS78] based key distribution scheme as the basis for a protocol that creates a new SA with whatever host attempts to communicate unsecured tra c in a manner that fails the packet-level security policy. At least one currently-distributed IPSEC implementation does just this, with the aim of performing \opportunistic encryption" whenever possible.
Unfortunately, protocols that merely arrange for packets to be protected under security associations do nothing to address the problem of enforcing a policy regarding the ow of incoming or outgoing tra c. Recall that policy control is a central motivation for the use of network-layer security protocols in the rst place.
In general, and rather surprisingly, security association policy is largely an open problem { one with very important practical security implications and with the potential to provide a solid framework for analysis of network security properties.
Fortunately, the problem of policy management for security associations can be distinguished in several important ways from the problem of ltering individual packets. In particular:
{ SAs tend to be rather long-lived; there is \locality of reference" insofar as hosts that have exchanged one packet are very likely to also exchange others in the near future. { It is acceptable for SA creation to require substantially more resources than can be expended on processing every packet (e.g., public key operations, several packet exchanges, policy evaluation, etc.) { The \output" of negotiating an SA between two hosts can provide (among other parameters) the parameters for lower-level packet ltering operations. We believe that a trust-management system, such as KeyNote BFK99], may be of value here.
A Trust Management Architecture for Network Layer Security
The problem of controlling SAs in a network-layer security protocol is easy to formulate as a trust-management problem. Trust-management systems are characterized by:
{ A method for describing \actions," which are operations with security consequences that are to be controlled by the system. { A mechanism for identifying \principals," which are entities that can be authorized to perform actions. { A language for specifying application \policies," which govern the actions that principals are authorized to perform. { A language for specifying \credentials," which allow principals to delegate authorization to other principals { A \compliance checker," which provides a service for determining how an action requested by principals should be handled, given a policy and a set of credentials.
The trust-management approach has a number of advantages over other mechanisms for specifying and controlling authorization, especially when security policy is distributed over a network or is otherwise decentralized.
In the case of SA policy, the \actions" would represent the low-level packet ltering rules required to allow two hosts to conform one another's higher-level policies.
This suggests a simple framework for trust management for Network-Layer Security:
{ Each host has its own trust-management-controlled policy governing SA creation. This policy speci es the classes of packets and under what circumstances the host will initiate SA creation with other hosts, and also what types of SAs it is willing to allow other hosts to establish. { When two hosts discover that they require an SA, they each propose to one another the \least powerful" packet-ltering rules that would enable them to accomplish their communication objective. Each host sends proposed packet lter rules, along with credentials (certi cates) that support the proposal. The trust structure of these credentials is entirely implementation dependent, and might include the arbitrary web-of-trust, globally trusted thirdparties, or anything in between. { Each host queries its trust-management system to determine whether the proposed packet lters comply with local policy and, if they do, creates the SA containing the speci ed lters.
Other SA properties might also be subject to trust management policy. For example, the SA policy might specify acceptable cryptographic algorithms and key sizes, the lifetime of the SA, logging and accounting requirements, etc.).
Our architecture divides the problem of policy management into two natural components: packet ltering, based on simple rules applied to every packet, and trust management, based on negotiating and deciding which such rules are trustworthy enough to install.
This distinction makes it possible to perform the per-packet policy operations at high data rates while e ectively establishing more sophisticated trustmanagement-based policy controls over the tra c passing through a secure endpoint. Having such controls in place makes it easier to specify security policy for a large network, and makes it especially natural to integrate automated policy distribution mechanisms.
An important practical problem in introducing security policy mechanisms is the transition from older schemes into the new one. Existing IPSEC security policies, which are based only on packet lters, quite easily t into the trust management framework. As the trust management mechanism is introduced, lter-based policies can be mechanically translated into trust-management policies and credentials.
Conclusions and Status
We have developed a number of trust management systems, and have started examining the use of KeyNote in the engineering of network-layer security protocols. We are in the process of implementing an IPSEC architecture similar to that described above; it is our hope that the formal nature of trust management will make possible network security con gurations with provable properties. One of the most relevant features of trust management to SA management is the handling of policy delegation.
Furthermore, because KeyNote is application-independent, it can be used to \tie together" di erent aspects of network security, beyond just IPSEC and packet ltering. For example, a more comprehensive network security policy could specify what mechanisms are acceptable for remote access to a private corporate network over the Internet; such a policy might, for example, allow the use of cleartext passwords only if tra c is protected with IPSEC or some transportlayer security protocol (e.g., SSH YKS + 99]). Multi-layer policies would, of course, require embedding policy controls into either an intermediate security enforcement node (such as a rewall) or into the end applications.
Finally, if trust-management policies and credentials are built into the network security infrastructure it may be possible to use them as an \intermedi-ate language" between the low-level application policy languages (e.g., packetltering rules) and higher-level policy speci cation languages and tools. A translation tool would then be used to convert the high-level speci cation to the trust-management system's language (and perhaps vice-versa as well). Such a tool could make use of formal methods to verify or enforce that the generated policy has certain properties.
There are many open, and we believe, quite interesting and important problems here.
